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Abstract 
This study estimates a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function using market data. and 
micro-econometric methods. We investigate the decision whether to purchase insurance 
against the risk of telephone line trouble in the home. Using the choices of approximately 
10,000 residential customers, we determine the shape of the utility function and the degree 
of risk-a.version. \Ve find that risk-aversion varies systematically in the population and 
varies with the level of income a.nd tha.t the observed choice behavior is cousisLent with 
expected utility maximization. We are unable to detect the presence of a.rn.biguity effects 
or over-weighting of low-probability events. 
A Micro-Econometric Analysis of Risk-A version 
and the Decision to Self-Insure* 
Charles J. Cicchetti! Jeffrey A .  Dubin+
1 Introduction
Whether expected utility theory is consistent with individual behavior is a question that 
has received considerable attention by economists, marketing scientists, and psycholo­
gists. The growing body of evidence, derived principally from laboratory experiments 
(see e.g. Mosteller and Nogee ( 19.51), Coombs and Komorita. (19.58) ,  Coombs and Huang 
( 1976), and Grether and Plott ( 1979)) ,  suggests that expected utility theory i s  frequently 
violated. Limitations of expected utility theory have led to the development of many al­
ternative theories such as prospect theory (Ka1rneman and Tversky ( 1979) ) ,  and ma.ny 
others (see e.g. Ca.merer ( 1991) for a comprehensive survey) .  While tests of consistency 
of the various theories with observed behavior have begun (see e.g. Camerer ( 1989), 
Ca.merer and Kunreuther ( 1989) ,  and Currim and Sarin (1989) ) ,  the conclusion of much 
of this analysis is that "no theory can expla.in all of the data, but prospect theory and the 
hypothesis that indifference curves fan out can explain most of them" Ca.merer ( 1989). 
There are at lea.st two reasons why the demise of expected utility theory may be pre­
mature. First, it ha.s been observed that inclividua1 experiments and market experiments 
often produce dissimilar results. ·while laboratory experiments have shown that individ­
uals may poorly estimate probabilities and violate the basic axioms of probability theory, 
experimental results in market settings have -been -more e1woura.ging (Ca.nH)rer (1987) ) .  
Second, experimental results are frequently categorized simply by whether or not they 
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obey the theoretical restrictions of a given model. 1 The advantage of this method of hy­
pothesis testing is that it does not require or impose specific forms of the utility or value 
function for the individual. But by avoiding the direct estimation of the utility function, 
researchers have ignored the potential for individual response error and for randomness 
or heterogeneity in preferences. 
The purpose of the present analysis is to address both of the above concerns by 
estimating a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function using market data and micro­
econometric methods. The empirical analysis we conduct is based on the decision whether 
to purchase insurance or to self-insure against the risk of telephone line trouble in the 
home. Using the choices of approximately 10,000 residentia.l customers we determine the 
shape of the utility function and the degree of risk-preference. Our model for the choice 
of firm-insurance versus self-insurance is based on expected utility theory and random 
utility maximization. We allow for both state-dependent and status-quo effects in the 
estimation and test for local departures from the expected utility theory by allowing 
"ambiguity" in the underlying uncerta.inty.2 
Laskey and Fischer (1987) have outlined four approa.ches to dealing with the prob­
lem of estimating utility functions in the presence of response error: they are ( 1 )  ignore
the problem; (2) average multiple judgments; (:3) employ consistency checks to eliminate 
problematic observations; and (4) fit preference models to the decision makers' responses. 
The latter approach is in fact the least common method for a.ssessing utility functions or 
for testing decision theories. Indeed the direct calibration of von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility functions by statistical techniques has received very little attention in the litera.­
ture.3 
In the marketing literature, Hauser (1978) and Hauser and Urban (1977, 1979) have 
discussed the measurement of multi-attribute utility functions from preference data while 
Eliashberg and Hauser (1985) and La.skey and Fischer (1987) have discussed the mod­
elling of risk-preferences in the presence of measurement error. Eliashberg and Hauser 
suggested a maximum likelihood procedure for estimating probabilistic choice wherein 
the probability that an alternative is selected arises from a random risk-parameter (which
may be known to the individual but unknown to the analyst) . Laskey and Fischer adopt 
a different perspective and introduce an additive disturbance in individuals' responses 
which affects the accuracy of the response rather than an individual's true preference. 
1 A recent exaillple of this reporting pract:ice appea.r"s in 'Rapoport: Z·nTick, and-Funk (1988). �;\_ notable 
exception, using Bayesian inference, appears in :fvia.rsha.ll1 Richard, and Zarkin ( 1992). 
2See Hogarth and l(unreuther (1989) for a discussion of a.1nbiguity effects. 
3Camerer (1991) cites only tv.10 recent exan1ples of studies \vhich directly estin1a.te utility functions. 
But early references to the statistical calibration of utility functions include f11Ieyer and Pratt (1968) 
who provide a method for "fairing" detern1inistically a smooth function through observed responses: 
Fishburn and l{ochenberger (1979) vvho use a minin1u1n 1nean-squared n1ethod, and Curriin and Sarin 
(1984) \Vho rely-on conjoint analyses. ·Tversky (1967) and Fischer (1976) also use for1ns of curve fitting 
to assess the utility function. 
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Empirical assessment of risk preference models with measurement error appear in 
Currim and Sarin (1989) and Daniels and Keller (1990).4 These studies fit either single 
risk parameters for each experimental subject or smooth approximations to the risk 
parameter as a function of experimental conditions. 
Measurement of van Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions has also appeared in the 
finance and economics literatures. Friend and Blume (1975), in their classic study of 
risk preference, showed that in market equilibrium the ratio of the expected premium on 
risky financial assets to the variance of those assets is related to a function of individuals' 
risk-aversion and the value of all risky results . Their study found evidence of a constant 
relative risk-aversion level for a representative consumer of approximately two.5 
There have also been attempts in the economics literature to estimate life-cycle con­
sumption and la.bar supply models. The studies by Altonji (1986), MacC:urcly (1981, 
1983), Browning, Deaton, and Irish (1985), Altug and Miller (1990), and Keane, Moffitt, 
and Runkle (1988) link individual level da.ta to aggregate financial data. vVhile these 
studies are able to demonstrate that utility is concave and increasing in leisure, their 
principal focus concerns intertemporal labor supply and the separability of consumption 
and leisure rather tha.n the determination of the degree of risk-aversion or the shape of 
the underlying utility function. 
Recently Viscusi and Evans (1990) and Evans and Viscusi (1991 )  ha.ve considered the 
estimation of state dependent utility functions from survey data. The data they employ 
are the percentage wage increase required to compensate a worker for a hypothetica.l 
change in the risk of a specific job occupation. Viscusi and Evans use the survey re­
sponses of 249 individuals to estimate the shape of a representative individual's utility 
function. In one a.pproa.ch, they use Taylor's approximations to the utility function and 
in another approach, they estimate a single parameter logarithmic utility function where 
the unknown parameter characterizes the health state.6 
Our empirical a.nalysis is most similar to that of Viscusi and Evans but relies on mar-
4C.oxi Smith, and \.,ialker (1988), like Curri1n and Sarin (1989), esti111a.te individual-specific risk 
para1neters using a log-concave constant relative risk-a.version n1odel. Their data con1e frorn an experi-
1nental analysis of first-price auctions. They find strong support for the hypothesis that individuals ate 
risk-averse in bidding and that the degree of risk-a.version varies fro1n individual to individual. 
5Estimation of risk para111eters \vithin asset-pricing 1nodels has been reported by Hall (1988), Breeden 
(1979), Breeden, Gibbons, Litzenberger (1989), Grossman, Melino, and Shiller (1987), Hansen and 
Singleton (1982,1983), Mehra and Prescott (1988), and Eichenbaum, Hansen, and Singleton (1988). 
Related studies which also use a representative consun1er and aggregate financial data, but relax the 
expected utility hypothesis, include Epstein and Zin (1987) and Weil (1989). While all of these studies 
attempt to deter1nine the degree of relative risk-a.version, there can be son1e lack of identification bet\veen 
the degree of risk-aversion and the degree of intertemporal substitution (Hall (1988)). 
6Edwards (1988) estin1ates a discrete-choice n1odel for households' \villingness-to-pa.y to prevent con­
tamination of a potable supply of ground 'vater. His approach is utility t.heoretic but relics on contingent, 
rather than actual values. 
ket rather than contingent valuation data. First, we use first and second-order Taylor's 
series expansions of the difference in utility states to examine the local properties of the 
underlying utility function; i .e . ,  whether insurance is an inferior good and whether con­
sumers, in fact, reveal risk-aversion. We then use a full information maximum likelihood 
procedure to estimate a fully parameterized structural model. Our results indicate that: 
( 1 )  risk-aversion varies systema.tically in the population and varies with the level of in­
come; (2) observed choice behavior is consistent with expected utility maximization; and 
(3) ambiguity effects and over-weighting of low-probability events are not present in this 
context. 
In the next section we discuss the basic inside-wire maintenance (IvVM)  contract 
which allows a consumer to insure against potential telephone line trouble. In Section 
I I I  we examine severa1 theories behind the purchase of IvVIVf contracts including service 
aspects, warranty aspects, a.ncl priority service aspects. In Section IV we develop a 
theory of inside-wire maintenance choice based on expected utility theory and discrete 
choice econometrics. Section V describes the data we use in the estimation while Section 
VI  develops both the reduced-form and the structural-form estimates. We conclude in 
Section VII. 
2 Inside Wire Maintenance Contracts
Inside-wire maintenance service contracts were created as a. result of the deregulation 
of the telephone industry. Before 1982, when the telephone industry was forced to un­
bundle many of its traditional service arrangements such as the insta1la.tion and repair 
of telephones and the inside wiring for telephones, all customers with basic telephone 
exchange service were charged a monthly fee which recovered installation and mainte­
nance costs. The single monthly charge paid by customers did not separate charges pa.id 
for ma.intenance or for installation. After the 1982 Federa1 Communication Commission 
(FCC) divestiture order, regional phone companies were required to terminate many ser­
vices such as phone repair and make optional some other services such as maintenance of 
inside home wiring. Phone customers could contract with the phone company to acquire 
IWM, they could hire a third party to do the work when it became necessary, or they 
could do it themselves. 
In some parts of the country customers were "negatively enrolled" in IIA!iVI programs. 
Negative enrollment occurred when customers were notified (typically by a phone bill 
insert) that they would automatically be charged for basic IvVM service unless they 
specifically notified the telephone company they did not want the maintenance contract. 
The negative enrollment aspect of inside-wire maintenance has brought challenges legally 
on the basis that many customers did not and would not havA selected IVV M contracts had 
they been non-passively enrolled.7 These legal challenges have raised serious economic 
issues: which individuals would have chosen IWM for each method of enrollment, how 
much were customers willing to pay to avoid the risk of inside wire trouble, and were 
individuals rational in their assessments of the probability of service interruption? 
It is important to consider that many customers were not negatively enrolled in the 
post-1982 period. Customers who initiated new phone service (perhaps by rnoving into 
or within the service region, or by adding new service) had the opportunity to choose 
from a variety of service features including IWM. We use a sample of individuaJs whose 
choices regarding I'vVM were non-passive to reveal the preferences of the population at 
large. 
As we discuss in detail below, our data comes from the Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Company (U.S .  West) service area . During the 1980's Mountain Bell 
customers faced a monthly probability of line trouble of less than 0.5 percent. The 
mean time to failure for line trouble was thus about 17  years. Typica.l charges for I\A/M 
were approximately $0.45 per month. \Vhen line trouble would occur repair charges 
averaged about $55.00. Therefore the expected cost of line trouble was about $0.27 per 
month. Mountain Bell customers therefore pa.id, on average, an amount greater than was 
actuarially fair. Yet, the market penetration of IWM among actively enrolled customers 
was well above 50 percent . In the next section we consider several tbeories (including 
risk-aversion) which help explain the purchase behavior of I'vVM .  
3 Theories of Purchase Behavior for IWM Con­
tracts 
The inside-wire maintenance contra.ct between customers and the phone company ha.s 
elements of several different commodities. We discuss three potentially important ele­
ments: ( 1 )  IWM as a service contract; (2) IVVM as a warranty and as insurance; and (:3) 
I'vVM as priority service. 
3.1 Service Contracts 
The literature on service contracts (see e.g. , Day and Fox (1985) a.nd Fox and Day (1988))  
indica.tes that service contracts are typica1ly expensive compared with the protection they 
provide; the expected cost of repair varies between 25 and .50 percent of the cost of the 
contract. Renewals for service contracts are typically low because of the low frequency of 
7See, e.g., Sollenberger, et al. v. ivlounta.in States Telephone and Telegraph Co, Civil Action No. 
87-1485-SC, 121 F.R. D. 417; U. S. Dist. LEXIS 13538, August 12, 1988, decided . 
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contact between the consumer and organization offering the contract. Day a.nd Fox find 
that incliviclua.ls with relatively little experience with a product class are more likely to 
buy a service contract a.ncl that "the only perceived convenience associated with service 
contracts was that a. customer would not have to seek out a. service/repair person."  But 
some features of IWM might make it more successful in gaining and keeping customers 
as compared with more typical service contracts. First, the IWM renewals a.re frequent 
(once per monthly bill) and the renewal cost seemingly is inexpensive. Second, the 
renewal process is convenient a.ncl requires no effort from the incliviclua.l. Third, some 
customers a.re unlikely to have ha.cl much persona.I experience with inside-wire trouble 
and may therefore over-estimate the probability of trouble. Finally, an Il'VM contract 
eliminates the need for a. costly search for a repair service if line trouble develops. These 
features of IWM make the firm-insured state more desira.blP than the self-insured state.8 
3.2 Warranties and Insurance 
IWM contracts have some features in common with warranties, but a.re perhaps better 
regarded a.s service contracts. As Emons ( 1989) observes, a warranty imposes more 
obligations on the seller than a service contract does. Also the method of payment for a 
warranty is different than that for a service contract-the warranty price typically is a. pa.rt 
of the purchase price (Gill and Roberts ( 1 989), Schwartz and \'Vilde (1983) ) .  Warranties 
a.re usually limited in duration while l'NM contracts a.re in theory renewable even iI 
a. customer allows coverage to lapse. The warranty literature (see e.g. Priest ( 1981 ) )
includes four basic theories: 
1 .  Signaling Theory. Sellers cannot control the intensity and ca.re of use of the prod­
ucts they sell. Buyers, on the other hand, a.re often unable to discern (or have 
imperfect information) on the quality of products prior to purchase. \'Va.rra.nties 
can a.meliorate this forrn of double moral ha.za.rcl by acting a.s a. signal to consumers 
of the quality of the product (vViener (1985), Lutz ( 1989 ) ,  a.nd Shimp and Bearden 
(1982)); 
2 .  Investment Theory. The warranty imposes obligations on manufacturers to make 
investments in design and quality control so as to reduce failure rates and the costs 
associated with failure and repair. vVananties also irnyiose obligations on buyers 
who make investments in the ca.re of the product; 
8In an empirical analysis of the de1nand for repair service during vvarranty, Gerner and Bryant (1980) 
found that as the value of the spouses tin1e increased, households <len1andecl greater \Varranty con1pre­
hensiveness. This suggests, if anything, that service and i.varranty contracts a.re norn1al goods. The 
results of the study by Gerner and Bryant are ho¥.rever far fron1 definitive. The ·value of ti1ne for the 
head of household had an opposite effect fron1 tha.t of the spouse and the va.lue of non-ix.rage incon1e ha.cl 
no statistically significant effect. 
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3 .  Exploitation Theory. The warranty service is a, marketing device to extract con­
sumer surplus by exploiting the risk-a.verse nature of consumers; a.nd 
4. Insurance Theory. Warranties represent a. response to the problem of efficient risk­
sha.ring when firms a.re risk-neutra1 and consumers are risk-averse.
1n·-t-heua.se.-of.ins-ide wire,.the"moml"ha.zard-problern should-oe m.inima.l since failure 
of inside wire should not be correlated with the intensity of use of telephone equipment. 
Buyers ma.y ha.ve imperfect information on the quality of the inside wiring, but the quality 
is discrete in nature-either the phone system communicates or it does not. On the other 
hand, exploitation theory may be relevant. In 1986 U.S \Vest marketed two new I'NM 
programs, "linebacker and linebacker plus" which provided backup phone instruments 
in the case of equipment failure. These programs were quite inexpensive for the phone 
company to offer and proba,bly served as marketing vehicles to stimulate overa11 demand 
for insurance contracts. 
The most applicable idea from the warranty literature is that of insurance. IvVM 
contracts are insurance policies which fully cover the cost of replacement or repair of 
the phone equipment. if it fails . Customers can not a.clopt to partially insure against 
the hazard of line failure so that the amount of insurance purchased is not relevant. 
Instead consumers must make a discrete decision on whether to firm-insure or to self­
insure.9 Nonetheless, risk-averse individua1s will have reservation values greater than the 
expected value of the gamble which they are willing to pay to avoid the uncertainty. 
Models of optimal insurance have been developed in Smith ( 1966), Lee and Pinches 
( 1988), and Dreze and Modigliani (1972).10 The theoretical model of Szpiro (1985) is 
most applicable to IWM because in his model only full coverage is possible." 
Empirical evidence on insurance purchases is largely laboratory experimenta1. Ca.merer 
and Kunreuther (1989) in an ana.lysis of insurance markets found little evidence sup­
porting prospect theory in favor of expected utility theory. Hogarth and K unreuther 
(1989) discuss how ambiguity regarding the event probability ca.n increase the premium 
above the actua.rially fair value that individuals are willing to pay for insurance. Her­
shey and Shoemaker ( 1980) ,  Kahneman a,nd Tversky (1979), and Smith and Desvousges 
9Ehrlich and Becker (1972) contra.st 111a.rket insurance (fir1n-insura.nce) \vith self-insurance and self­
protection. Self-insurance involves actions ta.ken by the individual to reduce the 111a.gnitucle of loss 1vhile 
self-protection involves actions taken tO reduce the probability of a loss. Our O\vn l1se of the ter1n 
self-insurance refers to the individual's state \Yhen he or she chooses not to buy 1na.rket insurance. 
10Recent theoretical literature on the den1and for insurance is concerned \vith \Vhether insurance is a 
Giffen good; this literature asserts that insurance purchases are inferior (Borch (1986), Hoy and Robson 
(1981), and Briys, Dionne, and Eeckhoudt (1989)). But these studies do not cite any evidence for this 
\videly accepted viev-.'. 
1 10ur situation is also sin1ila.r to that of DrCze (1981) \Vho sho\VS that the degree of absolute risk­
a.version can be inferred fro1n the a.n1ount of insurance purchased, the distribution of losses� the proba­
bility of loss, and the level of \Veal th. 
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( 1987) have observed in a series of experiments that individuals overweight low proba­
bility events suggesting that fair insurance becomes more attractive for low probability 
events. Hershey and Shoemaker also find a, strong context effect in which choices in­
volving insurance were judged with greater risk-aversion than mathematically identical 
choices presented as standard gambles. Shogren (1990), also using experimental data, 
found evidence to support Hershey and Shoemaker. He also found that individuals tend 
to overestimate the impact of low probabilities, but that the degree of overestimation 
decreased with repeated market exposure.12 
In a non-experimenta1 market analysis of self-insurance and self-protection, Brook­
shire, Thayer, Tschirhart, and Schulze (198.5) explain housing price differentials for ge­
ographically distinct areas in California with differing likelihoods of experiencing earth­
quakcs.13 Their model assumes that risk-averse individuals can self-insure by choosing 
to live in safer areas. In equilibrium housing price differentials should reflect the proba­
bility of an earthquake, the likely magnitude of loss, the wealth levels for representative 
consumers, and the degree of risk-aversion. Using a first-order Taylor series expansion of 
the utility function and auxiliary estimates of the key variables, the authors are able to 
demonstrate consistency of their heclonic estimates and those implied by expected utility 
theory. 
3.3 Priority Service 
Inside-wire maintenance also shares some aspects of priority service. Individuals who 
require service reliability or guaranteed access to the phone system may be willing to 
pay more for IvVM contracts .  But priority service offers gradations of service reliability 
to customers while inside wire contracts offer no gradations at all, merely a method of 
dealing with service outages once they occur. The priority service literature has also 
attempted to quantify outage costs-usually for electrical service (Hartnrnn, Doane, and 
Woo (1981 ) ) .  vVith telephone service there too may be costs a.ssociatecl with an outage 
other than the costs of repairs . If there is a perception on the part of customers that 
having an IWM contract reduces outage costs (perhaps through faster response time 
or less search time spent by the customer) then there may be a preference for IWM 
contracts.14 
12 Another finding due to l{ahnen1an and Tversky is that "people tend to undervveight outco1nes that 
are 1nerely probable in co1nparison vvith outcon1es that a.re obtained \vith certainty." The "certainty 
effect" also noted in \Tiscusi1 IVIa.gat a.nd Huber (1987) inay have direct relevance to the choice of I\1'livl 
contracts because consun1ers 111ay be '\villing to pay a pre1niu1n for the certain elin1ination of risks 
associated ¥.1ith l\i\TM failure over and above the a1nount they vvould be 1villing to pay to reduce the risk 
of this failure to son1e non-zero level. 
13_1\_ sin1ilar analysis appears in lVIacDonald1 :rviurdoch1 and \�Thite (1987) tvho use residential property 
values to study consun1er behavior \�rith respect to the uncertainty of land flooding. 
14Ha.rtman, Doane1 and VVoo also identify a strong preference for the status quo. In n1a.ny cases 
custon1ers must be con1pensa.ted for s\vitching reliability rcgin1es even 1Yhen the alternative entails rnore 
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Our theory of IVVM contrad choice most closely follows the discrete insurance model. 
To the extent that other motivations are present (status quo effects, ambiguity effects, cer­
tainty effects, priority effects, etc.) we generalize the expected utility model by allowing 
state dependence in the utility function, unobserved random preference, and ambiguous 
probabilities. These issues are ta.ken up below when we operationalize a structnrn.l rnodel 
for I\VM purchase. 
4 A Theory of Inside Wire Maintenance Choice 
Customers who choose inside-wire maintenance replace the uncertain possibility of having 
to pay for inside-wire repa.ir (both the direct charges for repair and the indirect costs of 
finding a repair service) with a guaranty of not having to bear the cost of repair at 
the expense of a fixed monthly fee. Risk-aversion and differing levels of income in the 
customer class lead some individuals to prefer firm-insurance to the alternative of self­
insura.nce. In  this section we develop a theory of I\VM choice and consider how properties 
of the utility function can be inferred from a population of non-identical consumers who 
reveal their preferences by their choices. 
We begin with a von Neunrnnn-Morgenstern utility function U(lV) which is increasing 
in wealth, U'(Hl) > 0. Let C denote the cost of repair for the uninsured individual, 
R denote the monthly fee for I'vVM, and p denote the exogenous probability of line 
trouble. The utility with insurance is U(\V - R). The expected utility under self­
insurance is pU(HI - C) + (1 -p)U(W) . For individuals with identical utility functions 
who face identical costs and probabilities, the decisions regarding insurance must be 
identical. Individuals will insure provided the utility with insurance exceeds the expected 
utility under self-insurance. In the population, individuals are heterogenous and not all 
components of utility are observable. We account for these differences empirically through 
three sources: ( 1 )  differing levels of risk-aversion, (2) differing levels of income, and (3) 
alternative specific preferences. Specifically we specify a utility function U(l11; s ,  i, Ei ) 
where s represents characteristics of the decision maker, i represents the state in which 
utility occurs (insured or self-insured), and E; represents a random component of indirect 
utility. 
To generate a. specific probabilistic choice system for observed choices, we follow 
McFadden ( 1983) and assume random utility maximization with additively separable 
random errors.1.s We therefore write the indirect utility function as: 
reliable service than they already receive. Possible explanations for status quo effects are discussed in 
Samuelson and Zeck.ha.user (1988). Since all telephone custon1ers vvere once in a regin1e 1vhich provided 
inside 1vire maintenance protection, there n1ay have been lingering status quo effects vvhich positively 
influenced the decision to contract for IVVlVI service 'vhen the choice 1vas offered. 
150ur develop1nent of a randon1 utility 1nodel for choice of inside-1vire n1a.intena.nce contra.ct shares 
g 
U(lV;s,i,Ei) = U(W;s,i) + E;. ( 1) 
Under the hypothesis of random utility maximization, the individual chooses to insure 
provided: 
or 
U(Hl - R; s, i, c1) > pU(Hl - C; s, 2, c2) + (l - p)U(Hl; s, 2, c2) (2) 
U(lY - R; s, 1) + E1 > [p[1(1¥ - C; s, 2) + (1 - p)U(lV; s, 2)] + Ez. (3) 
If we further assume that the E; a.re independent extreme-value distributed, then the 
probability associated with the event in equation (3) is given by 
where 
q probability that individual buys insurance 
Prob [cz - o1 <:: 61l] 
1/(1 + e-L>V) 
6 V = [J(Hl - R; s, 1) - [p0(Hi - C; s, 2) + (l - p)0(H!; s, 2)]. (5) 
The probability of purchasing IWM depends on the indirect utility difference 2:. V 
which is a. function of the individuals wealth level 11/, the costs R and C, the probability
of having line trouble p, and the degree of risk-aversion as embodied in the function U. 
To illustrate the foregoing ideas consider the following example. Suppose strict utility 
is given by the quadratic function U (H!) = HV - vV2 where b is a. parameter affecting the
curvature of the utility function. The function U(vV) exhibits positive marginal utility
of income provided Hl < b/2. The degree of absolute risk-a.version is positive in this
range with Ra = l/(b/2 - vV) and increasing in lY. The latter property is often too
restrictive in empirjcaJ applica.tions. For this example. we will simply fix the income level
and ask whether curvature in the utility function alone (a positive risk-aversion level) 
can be consistent with the observed distribution of preferences in the population. Since 
the choice probability q is constant in this case we can write the log-odds probability as: 
elements in con11non 'vith both Eliashberg and Ha.user and Lasky and Fischer. Since our 111odel assu1nes 
randon1 utility n1axin1iza.tion (lVIcFaclden (1983) )1 it shares the error structure of Lasky and Fischer. Ilut 
>Ye interpret the- randornness as do Eliashberg and Hauser-as· unobserved effects kno-vvn to t.he individua.i 
but unknown to the econon1etricia.11-rather than as response errors. 
10 
We solve for b using: 
Ll.V = log(-q -). 
1-q 
Ll.V = U(Hi -R)-[pU(\¥- C) + (1-p)U(l<V)] 
= [-Hi2 + (b + 2R)Hi - bR -R2] - [-W2 + (b + 2pC)\V - p C(b + C')] 
which implies 
(6) 
Using the value of b, we can calculate the degree of risk-aversion. \Ve can also calculate 
the cost of risk from not being on the inside-wire maintenance program. This is given by 
the amount R* which solves the equation 
U(H! -R*) = pU(H! - C') + (1 -p)U(vV);
1 .e., R* is the certainty equivalent of the ga.mble.16
This equality produces a quadratic equation in R*; the solution depends on the level 
of income TV, the log-odds of the market penetration for I\VM, Ll. V, and the constants p, 
C, and R. Intuitively we determine the risk-premium by explaining the market preference 
for insurance in the face of the actuarial unfair return. 
Risk-aversion need not be the only explanation for why individuals in aggregate prefer 
insurance to self-insurance. If, for example, the degree of absolute risk-a.version declines 
in income, then the amount an individual wonlcl be willing to pay to a.void a fixed size 
gamble declines as income increases i.e. if R� (H!) ::_'. 0 then dR* / dl;J! ::_'. 0. A proof of 
this result is provided by Mossin (1968) or one can easily verify that convexity of the 
funct.ion.f(JJ) = U'(W - W(v)) -[p[T'(Hi -C) + (l -p)U'(H')] in the inlcncal p E [O, 1] 
is sufficient for dR* / cnv ::_'. 0.  
Knowing whether R* declines as income increases is  not sufficient to determine whether 
Ll. V will decrease; although Ll. V = U(vV - R) -U(VV -R*), the income level vV is in­
creasing a.t the same time as R* is declining. Is there a. set of conditions under which 
16\t"Villingness to pay in this context also has an interpretation as an option price. See e.g. Sch1nalensee 
(1972) and Freeman (1984). 
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discrete insurance purclrnses are inferior? To answer this question we examine 86 \l/EIHI. 
From equation (5) ,  
86\I 
EIHI U'(l¥ - R) - [pU'(HI - C) + (1  - p)U'(H')] 
U'(W - R)- U'(W - R*){l - dR* /dW]
[U'(H! - R) - U'(HI - R*)] + U'(W - R*)dR* /dW (7 )  
·when the individual's maximum willingness to pay R* i s  greater than the market cost 
of discrete insurance R, U'(IV - R*) > U'(H! - R) as long as utility is strictly concave.
Since the first term in equation ( 7) is negative, a sufficient condition for El c. v I oH' ::;
0 is that dR* /dHI :S 0. But tbis is only a. sufficient condition and it is possible for 
El6V / EIHI :S 0 when dR* / cllcV close to zero. vVhen the individual's maximum willingness 
to pay R* is less than the market cost R, the first term in equation (7) is positive and it 
is necessary that dR* /dvV be negative (and sufficiently so) in order that 86 V/EllV < 0. 
The above analysis demonstrates that au empirical observation of discrete insurance 
purchases as inferior does not limit a priori the class of admissible utility functions. This 
observation notwithstauding, a. family of utility functions which allows non-consta.nt abso­
lute risk-aversion may be a good candidate for structural estimation when it is reasonably 
assured that the individual's willingness to pay exceeds the market price. 
5 Description of Data
Our analysis is based on a random sample of 25,099 observations of residential customers 
in the Mountain Bell Colorado service area. The sample was ta.ken from customer records 
in July 1990. Mountain Bell maintains records of its customers for the purposes of 
billing and telemarketing. Billing records contain information on the presence of or la.ck 
of various service options and the size of the monthly bill. vVe use the billing records 
to define two variables. First, any household which subscribes to an IvVM program 
and pays a monthly service charge for this option is assigned a. value of one. All other 
households a.re assigned a va.lue of "ero. Second, we Hse the -billing !'('Cords to define a 
typical monthly bill (BILL) which .is equal to the average amount paid by the household 
for service and tolls (this includes the a.mounts pa.id for special service features such as 
inside-wire maintenance, mil waiting, and the like) .  
Mountain Bell maintains twenty-four variables for ea.ch customer matched either from 
company records or from census da.ta.  In I.he case of monthly income, a. ca.tegorica.l 
variable matched a.t the block group/ enumeration district level (a. sub-ca.tegorization of 
census tract) is the basis for our continuous variable (MIN C) .  We also use information 
from company records to determine when a customer initia.tecl telephone service. Cus­
tomers with phone service prior to March 1982 were passively enrollee! in basic inside-wire 
maintenance service, while subscribers who started phone service after March 1982 were 
actively enrolled. To only include households who actively cleciclecl about the IVVM op­
tion, we restrict the sample to those households who began service after March 1982. 
This eliminates a total of 9,663 households from the analysis. vVe also define a dummy 
variable (POST86) to indicate whether a household initiated phone service after or prior 
to 1986. This variable is used to capture differences in the types of inside-wire main­
tenance service options available during the period 1982-1990. Prior to 1986 Mountain 
Bell offered only a basic inside-wire service contract. In 1986, Mountain Bell introduced 
a new type of IWM. To allow for the shift in demand which may have result.eel from the 
introduction of these new forms of !WM, we use the treatment variable POST86. 
We have further elimina.tecl from the sample any incliviclua1s who are employees of 
the phone company and receive service a.t no charge ( 148 households ) ,  and have also 
eliminated households for which data is missing ( 4,644 households) .  After these deletions, 
our analysis sample consists of ] 0,644 households. 
In addition to billing and telemarketing records, we have used company records to 
determine the frequency of line trouble for differing service zones in the metropolitan 
Boulder/Denver area. Mountain Bell maintains "trouble tickets" which a.re records of 
individual trouble calls serviced by the company. The trouble tickets contain the nature 
of the trouble and the phone number for the lines which were serviced. Some :350,000 
trouble tickets for Colorado residential a .nd business customers were used to estimate the 
probability of inside-wire trouble in various regions of Colorado. 
vVe divided the metropolitan Boulder/Denver a.rea. into eight geographic regions by 
selecting geographically adjacent phone number prefixes according to the Boulder addi­
tion of the White and Yellow pages for 1990. In principal, trouble probabilities could 
be calculated for each individual prefix. In practice, however, too few trouble events or 
phone numbers were found for a.ny given prefix to produce reliable estimates of the under­
lying trouble probabilities. Trouble probabilities (TPROB) were determined by finding 
the average number of monthly trouble occurrences by zone (in eight zones and a resid­
ual zone) for the yea.rs 1982-1986 and then dividing by the average number of customers 
in the corresponding region who were covered under the company's IVVM program (the 
latter data was also provided by Mountain Bell). Observations of trouble events were 
limited to the years 1982-19 86 due to data availability, but should be representci.tive for 
later years as well. Trouble probabilities were assignee! to indiviclua.l customer records 
based on the prefix of the individual's phone number. A histogram for the trouble prob­
ability is shown in Figure 1. Variable definitions and sample statistics are summarized 
in Table l. 
As can be seen from Table 1, ,57 percent of households subscribe to inside-wire main­
tenance. Nearly 70 percent of households acquired service after 1986 which reflects the 
high degree of turnover in the residential population. Households averaged about $20,000 
in annual income and ha.cl typical monthly phone bills of about $25.00. Monthly trouble 
probabilities (summarized in Ta.hie 2) ra.nged from 0.00318 to 0.00742 (Zoues 5 and 4 re­
spectively) . The differences iu zonal trouble probabilities reflect differences in the vintage 
of the underlying housing stock and differences in the vintage of phone equiprnentY 
6 Estimation 
We now examine the consistency of the observed choices of inside-wire ma.intena.nce with 
expected utility theory. vVe also illustra.te how recluced-forrn estimation of the utility 
function can be used to recover key structural para.meters. 
6.1 Reduced-Form Estimation 
Estimation of the probabilistic choice model given by equation ( 4) requires either a direct
specification of the function 6 V or an approximation of this function. This section takes
the latter approach. Since, 
6.V = f(l1V,p) = [U(Hl - R) - U(\¥)] - p [U(Hl - C) - U(Hl)J
a. second-order Taylor series expansion of 6 V in wealth and the probability of trouble is
given by 
f(\¥, p) -'- f(\¥0,Po) + fw(H1 - H�,) + fp(p - Po)
+�fww(l+' - 1Vo)2 + fwp(lV - H1o)(p - Po)+ �J;,p(p - Po)2.
The partial derivatives inthis case are: 
fiv = [U'(H! - R) - U'(vV)] - p[U'(vV - C) - U'(TV)],
17Thc mean trouble probability reported in Table 1 and the aggregate trouble proba.bilit,y reported 
in Table 2 differ slightly due to differences in the distribution of custon1ers betvveen the billing and 






-[U(HI - C) - U(H!)], 
-[U'(H! - C) - U'(TV)],
0, 
[U"(VV - R) - U"(H!)] - p[U"(Hi - C) - U"(T+')].
The redueed�form·estimation .method .uses .the"l·inea.r.,mcLquacli:a.tic terms in Hf and 
p as explanatory variables in a binary logit model for choice of IWM service. A negative 
value for fw indicates that insurance is inferior and has implications for the properties of
the underlying utility function as discussed above. A positive estimate of fp shows that
the utility is increasing in wealth. A negative value of fwp reveals concavity in the utility
function. Similarly the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on the second-order terms 
provide additional information about the shape of the utility function. 
In Table 3 we present the reduced-form logit models. In each model we include an 
alternative specific construct and a dummy variable for those households which acquired 
telephone service after 1986. These two terms are entered to allow for state dependence 
in the utility structure, i .e., they represent shifts in tastes and preferences which may be 
attributable to the insured versus uninsured states. In all cases the POST86 variable has 
a positive and significant coefficient which affirms the hypothesis that consumers found 
the nVM insurance plans collectively more valuable after 1986. 
Models 1 and 2 are estimated as baseline cases and do not include the income and 
probability covariates. In Model 3 we include income, the trouble probability, a.nd the 
size of the monthly telephone bill Our hypothesis is that consumers with higher average 
bills require more reliable service ancl a.re willing to pay a premium to insure reliability. 
The coefficient of BILL is significant and positive in the various models. This confirms 
our hypothesis that BILL provides a measure of the importa.nce of service reliability to 
const11ners. 
The coefficient of income in Model 3 shows that discrete insurance purchases are 
inferior. As income rises the probability that an individual will self-insure increases. The 
sign of the trouble ·probability variable in Model :3 is also consistent with the theory. 
An increase in the trouble probability increases the demand for IWM and reduces the 
probability of self-insurance. Model 4 is a simple reprise of Model 3 using only the first· 
order tenns from the Taylor series <expansion. Note that the centering of the income 
and probability terms around their mean values shifts the estimated intercept coefficient. 
Finally, Model 5 adds the second-order terms to Model 4. Here again the coefficients on 
the linear income and probability terms are consistent with the theory. The coefficient on
the squared probability term is not significant (also consistent with the predictions of the
theory) . The cross-partial term also has the correct sign for a population of risk-a.verse
• 1· . l 1 , , ,, t' j , rY' • , • , . , t t . , , I �· II 1na1v1nt1a1s, OllG r,11e es ·1111a."Lea coemc1eni 1s no-i:; s1g111n_cani a - co11ven io11a11e1-'e s .  l' i11a y, 
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the squared income term is positive and significant which indicates that the propensity 
to self-insure is increasing at a decreasing rate.18 
In principal the estimated coefficients from the reduced-form estimation can be used 
to reconstruct the utility function. To illustrate the approach we use the estimates from 
Model 4 and the negative exponential utility function. Suppose then that U(T,V) = 
-ae-bW with a, b > 0.  Then U'(H!) = abe-bW > 0,  and U"(T,V) = -ab2e-bW < 0.
Thus absolute risk-aversion is constant with: Ra(W) = -U" /U' = b. For the negative 
exponential utility fraction, 
fp - [U(vV - C) - U(Hi)] 
- [-ae-b(W-C) _ -ac-bw] = ae-bJ+' [ebC _ l]
.fw [U'(W - R) - U'(l•V)] - p [U'(lV - C) - U'(H!)] 
[abe-b(W-R) - abe-bW] - p [abe-b(W-C) - abe-bW]
abe-bw [(e6R - 1)  - p(e6c -1)].
Let qi = fw /f;,. Then:





bebR = qi + bp - b. 
From Model 4 in Table :3, _t;, = 89.:36 and .fw = -28, 810.0 (after a change in scale 
to reflect the units of income) .  Assuming values of C = $.S.S.00 for the fixed repair 
cost and R = $0.4.S/month for the cost of insurance, and sample averages MINC = 
$1699.40 and TPROB = 0.00477 implies a numerical soh1tion of b = 0.01936. The
willingness-to-pay R* satisfies U(vV - R*) = pU(H! - CJ + (1  - p)U(l•V) and has a
solution R* = t log[l + p(e6c -1) ] .  Since R* exceeds the market cost R, 8611/oHl < 0.
In this case, increases in incorne lower the proba])ility that instn<mcc is purchased even 
though absolute risk-aversion is constant. 
Given the la,ck of precision attached to some of the estimates in Model 5, a similar 
mapping of reduced-form to structurnl-forrn models does not seem warranted. 
18\Tiscusi and Evans (1990) found their second-order Taylor series ter1ns to be insignificant. 
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6.2 Structural-Form Estimation 
We now consider the structural estimation of a. utility function consistent with the re­
vealed preferences of individuals who ma.de choices regarding IWM service. The class of 
utility functions we adopt allows risk-a.version to va.ry among individuals with the same 
level of income a.nd to vary with the level of income for otherwise identical individuals. 
We specify utility to be a member of hyperbolic absolute risk-a.version (HARA) class 
with:19 
U(Hl) =al· (W + a2)L. ( 8 )  
This utility class contains several well known utilitv functions as special cases in­
cluding linear, quadratic, negative exponential, power, and log. The degree of absolute 
risk-aversion for the utility function in equation (8) is 
1- L 
R0(HI) = --­HI+ a2 
which is declining in both 1¥ and L. Monotonicity and concavity require that 0 < L < l.
The arguments to the binary logit function for the choice probability are L:> V and the
state dependent variables: Constant and POST86. To allow the level of risk-a.version to 
vary a.cross individuals we take the para.meter L to be a. linear function in the monthly 
bill:20 
L = bl + b2 · BILL. (9) 
This choice is consonant with our findings in the reduced-form analysis where we 
found that customers with larger bills were more likely to purchase IWM contracts. \Ve 
therefore expect the coefficient b2 to be negative which implies that as BILL increases 
the degree of risk-a.version increases. Since the willingness-to-pay will increase with the
level of absolute risk-a.version, L:> V = U(vV - R) - U(H1 - R*) will increase ma.king it
more likely that insurance will be purchased. 
Since ambiguity or over-weighting effects may be present, we embed the observed 
probability within a transforma.tion tha.t allows individuals to consistently under or over­
estimate the true trouble probability. We specify the log-odds ratio for the subjective 
19See e.g. Merton (1971) for a discussion of the HARA class. 
20\Tiscusi and Evans explore heterogeneity in their estin1a.tion by ta.king key pa.ra.111eters to be linear 
functions of individual characteristics. None of-the characteristic data. \Vas significant (at the five percent 
level) in their estin1a.tion. 
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probability of line trouble to be a linear function of the log-odds ratio of the true line 
trouble probability: 
p log(-- ) =  cl+ c2 
1 - p 
I 
TPROB 
og( l - TPROB ). ( 10 )  
This i s  equivalent to specifying a Iogit probability for p as a function of a constant 
term and the log-odds of TPROB. The specification in equation (8) allows the subjective
probability to be constant ( c2 = 0),  equal to the actual probability (cl = 0. c2 = 1) ,  or
consistently biased with measurement of the bias reflected in the coefficient va.lucs for cl 
and c2. The model we estimate by FIML is then 
Qi = [individual i purchases IvVM] 
L + cld1+d2 · POSTSG +t>v, J 
(11) 
In all eight parameters are estimated: al and a2 which characterize the utility function
in equation (8) , b l  and b2 which characterize risk-a.version in equation (9 ) ,  cl and c2 which
characterize subjective probability in equation (10) , and dl and d2 which characterize
state dependent effects in equation ( 1 1 ) .  
The results of the estimation are presented in  Table 4. The models we present vary 
depending on whether the subjective probability is constrained or not constrained in its 
relationship to the actual probability. The results are similar a.cross the specifications. 
In Model 3, for example, the parameters of the utility function al and a2 are both 
significant. The sign of al  shows that the probability of purchasing insurance increases
with 6 V as expected.21 The significance of the term a2 rejects the power utility function 
in favor of the more general HARA class. 
The coefficients b l  and b2 for the risk parameter L( b l, b2) are each sig11ificant and b2 
has the hypothesized negative sign. Predicting the risk-aversion parameter L for each 
sample observation, we find tha.t L is positive in about 78 percent of all hm1seholds 
(consistent with expected utility theory) ,  but negative in the remaining 12  percent (in· 
consistent with expected utility theory). The distribution .of L is shmvn in Figure 2. L 
has an average value of 0.37 with a rninimum of -8.86, a maximum of 2.87 .. and a standard 
deviation of 1.28. In about 41 percent of the cases L lies in the unit interval. In these 
cases individuals experience declining absolute risk-aversion. 'vVith only 12 percent of 
the cases having point-predictions which are non-positive, the overall pattern of results 
is remarkably consistent with expected utility. 
21 The para.meter aO is not cletern1ined independently of the sea.le of the logit n1odcl. 
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The estimated values for the parameters cl and c2 reveal that consumers use a subjec­
tive probability which is nearly identical to the actual probability: cl is not statistically 
different from zero while c2 is significant but not significantly different from one. There 
is thus slight evidence that consumers overestimate the small trouble probability event, 
but not to any significant degree. 
The estimates of the coefficients dl a.nd d2 are similar to those we obta.ined in the 
reduced-form estimation for the alternate specific constant and the POST86 dummy 
variable. The only difference is that the intercept is significant from zero in the structural 
estimates. 
7 Conclusions 
Day and Fox (1985) hypothesized that "relatively affluent persons, especially those who 
also are well ecluca.tecl, are less likely to perceive real value in appliance service contracts, 
because these persons generally tend to be less risk-a.verse, i.e., more likely to self-insure, 
than consumers on restricted budgets."  Our estimation ha.s confirmed the presence of 
risk-aversion and has also revealed that I\"IM purchases are for the most pa.rt inferior. 
The results we have obtained a.re also very encouraging for expected utility theory. 
The coefficients determined in the structural estimation were significa.nt and in accord 
with our expectations. For most consumers increases in income lead to increa.ses in the 
likelihood that self-insurance was selected. On the other hand, consumers who bad higher 
phone usage were less likely to self-insure. 
The structural models provided significant improvement in overall fit as compared 
with the reduced-form models, as evidenced by the significant improvement in the log­
likelihoods at convergence (note that Model 5 of Ta.hie 3 and Model :3 of Table '1 have
the same degrees of freedom) . Moreover, the structural logit model correctly predicts 
the choices of a.bout 65 percent of the cases which is significant since the frequency of 
observed selection was only :)7 percent choosing IWM versus 43 percent not doing so. 
The HARA utility cla.ss was also found to perform better than other common choices 
such as log and negative exponential in the sense that imposing these functional forms 
either lead to problGms with non-convcrgencn Dr ·m0dels which rnnvcrged to implausible
values (such a.s everywhere non-monotonic utility) . This may explain some of the dif­
ficulty encountered by Viscusi and Evans ( 1990) .  Using log-utility, Viscusi and Evans 
were able to solve for the exact risk premium in closed form. Their estimation was ac­
complished using non-linear lea.st squares. For other forms of the utility function, Viscusi 
and Evans were not able to solve directly for the risk-premium and were therefore unable 
to es-ti1nate tl1eir i11oclel by i1011-lir1ear least squares. Their atter11pts at fl1ll-i11for111a.tior1 
ma.ximum likelihood methods were non-convergent .  
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Our estimation sample does not reftect the greater pa,rticipation levels for IWM which 
prevailed in the 1980's. In order to gauge the willingness-to-pay by individuals to a.void 
telephone line trouble we have made an adjustment to the alternative specific constant in 
the structural logit model to reflect a 70 percent market penetration. In the 1980's, the 
median individual was willing to pay about $0 . . 55 per month to avoid inside wire trouble, 
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Table 1 
Sample Statistics and Variable Definitions 
Standard 
Name Description Mean Min Max Deviation 
IWM Inside wire maintenance 0.571 0.0 1 . 0  OA95 
service option 
MINC Monthly Income ($) 1699.4 3 12 .5 62.50.0 61 :3 .S  
BILL Monthly bill ( $ )  25.30 5 .0 100.0 10 .42 
TPROB Trouble Probability 0.00477 0.00:318  0.00742 0.00093 
POST86 Service Acquired 0 .687 0.0 1 .0 0 .463 
After 1 986 
Number of 
Observations 10 ,644 
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Table 2 
Monthly Trouble Probabilities, 1982-1986 
Trouble 
Probability 
Region (TPROB ) 
Zone 1 0 .004419 
Zone 2 0.005049 
Zone ;3 0.00tl349 
Zone 4 0. 007424
Zon_e 5 0.00318:3 
Zone 6 0.004189 
Zone 7 0.0039:38 
Zone 8 0.005614 




Reduced-form Logit Models 
Dependent Variable: IWM 
1 Purchase Insurance (57.193) 0 Self-Insure ( 42.93) 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model :3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 0'.286 -0 .402 '0:939 -1.003 -0.996 
( 1 4.64)*  ( -11 .37) (-5.8:3 )  (-15.56) (-14.67) 
POST86 1 .015 0.984 0.984 0.98:l 
(23.58) (22.5 5 )  (22.S.5) (22.50) 
BILL 0.0249 0.0249 0.0248 
( 1 1 .61 ) ( 1 1 .61 )  ( 11 .51)  




MINC-MINC -0.288 -0 .318  
( 8 .03) (-7.87) 
TPROB-TPROB 89.36 146 . l  
(3.72) ( 3 .23) 
(MINC-MINC)2 0 .0718 
( 2 .84)  
(TPROB-TPROB)2  -:34671 
( - Li7) 
(MIN C - MINC) x -3.39 
(TPROB-TPROB) (-0.07) 
Log-Likelihood -7269.8 -6984 . l  -6852.8 -6852 .8 -684 7 .1 
Number of Observations 10,644 10 ,644 10,644 10,644 10 ,614 
*t-statistics in parentheses.
Table 4 
Structural Logit Models 
Dependent Variable: IWlvl 








el l  
d2 
Log-Likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Model 1 










1 .0  
Constrained 
-0.054 
( - 1 . 17) 
0.992 
(22.66) 




Model 2 Model :3 
19:35. l 1949.4 
( 1 8.24) ( 18.22) 
0.6456 0.6475 
(4 .28:3) (4.253) 
3.498 3.497 
(20.98) (H.75) 
-0 .12:3 -0. 124 
( - 1 3 .6:3) ( - 12 .89) 
0.0 -0.0021 
Constrained ( 0.0012 )  
1 . 0093 1 .0096 
(72.41 )  (2. 7 1 )  
-0.050 -0.054 
(-106) (-J . 1 2)
0.992 0.988 
en 6" )  � � .  a (22.57) 
-6790.9 -6790.9 
l0 .6'14 10,6'14 
Count 
5 0 0 0  
4 0 0 0  
3 0 0 0  
2 0 0 0  
1 0 0 0  
0 
Figure 1 :  Distribution of Trouble Probabilities 
I 




5 0 0 0  
4 0 0 0  
3 0 0 0  
2 0 0 0  
1 0 0 0  
0 
- 1 0  





Altonji, Joseph G.,  "Intertemporal Substitution in Labor Supply: Evidence from Micro 
Data,'' Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986) :177-215. 
Altug, Sumru; and Miller, Robert A. ,  "Household Choices in Equilibrium," Economet­
- rim 58 ·{1990 ):543"569. 
Borch, Karl, "Insurance and Giffen's Paradox," Economics Letters 20 (1986) :303-306. 
Boyd, J. H.; and Mellman, R. E., "The Effect of Fuel Economy Standards on the U. 
S .  Automobile Market: A Hedonic Demand Analysis," Transportation Review 14A 
(1978):367-378. 
Breeden, Douglas T., "An Intertemporal Asset Pricing Model with Stochastic Consump­
tion and Investment Opportunities,'' Journal of Financial Economy 7 (1979):265-
296. 
Breeden, Douglas T., "Consumption Risk in Futures Markets," Journal of Finance 35 
( 1980) :503-520. 
Breeden, Douglas T.; Gibbons, Michael R.; and Litzenberger, Robert H., "Empirical 
Tests of the Consumption-Oriented CAPM," Journal of Finance 44 (1989):231-262. 
Briys, Eric; Dionne, Georges; and Eeckhoudt, Louis, "More on Insurance as a Giffen 
Good,'' Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2 (1989):415-420. 
Brookshire, David S . ;  Thayer, Mark A. ;  Tschirhart, John; and Schulze, William D. ,  
"A Test of the Expected Utility Model: Evidence from Earthquake Risks," The 
Journal of Political Economy 93 (1985):369-389. 
Browning, M. ;  Deaton, A. ;  and Irish, M. ,  "A Profitable Approach to Labor Supply and 
Commodity Demands over the Life-Cycle,'' Econometrica 53 (1985) :503-543. 
Camerer, Colin F. ,  "Do Biases in Probability Judgements Matter in Markets? Experi­
mental Evidence," A merican Economic Review 77 (1987) :981-997. 
Camerer, Colin F., "An Experimental Test of Several Generalized Utility Theories,'' 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2 (1989):61-104. 
Camerer, Colin; and Kunreuther, Howard, "Experimental Markets for Insurance,'' Jour­
nal of Risk and Uncertainty 2 (1989):265-300. 
Camerer, Colin, "Individual Decision Making,'' Forthcoming: J. Kagel and A. Roth 
(eds.) ,  Handbook of Experimental -Economics (1991). 
27 
Coombs, Clyde H. ;  and Huang, Lily C. ,  "Tests of the Betweenness Property of Expected 
Utility," Journal of Mathematical Psychology 13 (1976):323-337. 
Coombs, C. H. ;  and Komorita, S. S. ,  "Measuring Utility of Money Through Decisions," 
American Journal of Psychology 71 (1958):383-389. 
Cox, James C.;  Smith, Vernon L.;  and Walker, James M. ,  "Theory and Individual 
- -Behavio:rof ,F:irst�Pri-ce Auctions," -Journa/-ofRisk and - Uncertainty 1 (}988) :61-99. 
Currim, I. S . ;  and Sarin, R. K. ,  "A Comparative Evaluation of Multiattribute Consumer 
Preference Models," Management Science 30 (1984):543-561. 
Currim, Imran S. ;  and Sarin, Rakesh K. ,  "Prospect Versus Utility." Management Sci­
ence 35 (1989 ):22-41 . 
Daniels, Richard L . ;  and Keller, L. Robin, "An Experimental Evaluation of the De­
scriptive Validity of Lottery-Dependent Utility Theory," Journal of Risk and Un­
certainty 3 (1990) :115-134. 
Day, Ellen; and Fox, Richard J., "Extended Warranties, Service Contracts and Mainte­
nance Agreements-A Marketing Opportunity?" Journal of Consumer Marketing 2 
(1985):77-86. 
Dreze, Jacques H.,  "Inferring Risk Tolerance from Deductibles in Insurance Contracts,'' 
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 20, (1981 ) :48-52. 
Dreze; and Modigliani, "Consumption Decisions Under Uncertainty,'' Journal of Eco­
nomic Theory 5 (1972) :308-335 
Edwards, Steven F., "Option Prices for Groundwater Protection,'' Journal of Environ­
mental Economics and Management 15 (1988):475-487. 
Ehrlich, Isaac; and Becker, Gary S . ,  "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," 
The Journal of Political Economy 80 (1972) :623-648. 
Eichenbaum, Martin S . ;  Hansen, Lars Peter; and Singleton, Kenneth J . ,  " A  Time Series 
Analysis of Representative Agent Models of Consumption and Leisure Choice Under 
Uncertainty,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics (1988):51-76. 
Eliashberg, Jehoshua; and Hauser, John R., "A Measurement Erroi Approach for Mod­
eling Consumer Risk Preference," Management Science 31 (1985) : 1-25. 
Eliashberg, J. ,  "Consumer Preference Judgments: An Exposition with Empirical Ap­
plications,'' Management Science 26 (1980):60-77. 
Err1ons, VVinand, ('The Theory of- VVarranty Contracts," Journal of Economic Surveys 
3 (1989):43-57. 
28 
Epstein, L. G. ;  and Zin, S. E. (1987) , "Substitution, Risk Aversion and the Temporal
Behaviour of Consumption and Asset Returns II: An Empirical Analysis," Working
Paper 8718 (University of Toronto, Toronto) .
Evans, William N. ;  and Viscusi, W. Kip, "Estimation of State-Dependent Utility Func­
tions Using Survey Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics 73 (1991 ) :94-
104. 
Farquhar, Peter H. ,  "Utility Assessment Methods," Management Science 30 ( 1984) : 1283-
1300. 
Fishburn, P. H. ;  and Kochenberger, G. A. ,  "Two-Piece von Newmann-Morgenstern 
Utility Functions," Decision Science 10 (1979) :503-518.
Fischer, Gregory W., "Multidimensional Utility Models for Risky and Riskless Choice," 
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 17 (1976) : 127-146.
Fox, Richard J.; and Day, Ellen, "Enhancing the Appeal of Service Contracts: An
Empirical Investigation of Alternative Offerings," Journal of Retailing 3 (1988) :335-
351. 
Freeman, A. Myrick, III, "The Sign and Size of Option Value," Land Economics 60 
(1984) : 1-13.
Friend, Irwin; and Blume, Marshall E., "The Demand for Risky Assets," The American 
Economic Review 65 (1975) :900-922.
Gerner, Jennifer L. ;  and Bryant, W. Keith, "The Demand for Repair Service during 
Warranty," Journal of Business 54 (1980) :397-414.
Gill, H. Leroy; and Roberts, David C. ,  "New Car Warranty Repair: Theory and Evi­
dence," Southern Economic Journal 55 (1989) : 662-678.
Grether, David M. ;  and Plott, Charles R., "Economic Theory of Choice and the Pref­
erence Reversal Phenomenon," American Economic Review 69 (1979) :623-638.
Grossman, S. J. ;  Melino, A. ;  and Shiller, R. J. ,  "Estimating the Continuous-Time 
Consumption-Based Asset-Pricing Model," Journal of the A merican Statistical As­
sociation 5 (1987) :315-327.
Hall, Robert E., "Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption," The Journal of Political 
Economy 96 (1988) :339-357.
Ham, et al. v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., aka U.S.  West Com­
munications, a Colorado corporation, dba U.S.  West Communications; Plaintiffs' 
Trial Data Certificate; Case No. 87-CV-231246, District Court, City and County 
of Denver, State of Colorado. 
29 
Hansen, Lars Peter; and Singleton, Kenneth J . ,  "Stochastic Consumption, Risk A version 
and the Temporal Behavior of Asset Returns," The Journal of Political Economy 
91 (1983) :249-265. 
Hansen, Lars Peter; and Singleton, Kenneth J., "Generalized Instrumental Variables Es­
timation of Nonlinear Rational Expectations Models,'' Econometrica 50 ( 1982): 1269-
1286. 
Hartman, Raymond S.; Doane, Michael J . ;  and Woo, Chi-Keung, "Consumer Rational­
ity and the Status Quo,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (1981) :141-162. 
Hauser, John R.; and Urban, Glen L., "Assessment of Attribute Importances and Con­
sumer Utility Functions: von Neumann-Morgenstern Theory Applied to Consumer 
Behavior," Journal of Consumer Research 5 (1979):251-262. 
Hauser, John R., "Consumer Preference Axioms: Behavioral Postulates for Describing 
and predicting Stochastic Choice," Management Science 24 ( 1978) :1331-1341. 
Hauser, John R.; and Urban, Glen L., "A Normative Methodology for Modeling Con­
sumer Response to Innovation,'' Operations Research 25 (1977) :579-629. 
Hauser, John R.;  and Urban, Glen L., "Direct Assessment of Consumer Utility Func­
tions: von Neumann-Morgenstern Theory Applied to Marketing,'' Journal of Con­
sumer Research 5 (1979):251-262. 
Hershey, John C. ;  and Schoemaker, Paul J. H., "Risk Taking and Problem Context 
in the Domain of Losses: An Expected Utility Analysis,'' Journal of Risk and 
Insurance 47 (1980):1 1 1-132. 
Hershey, John C.; Kunreuther, Howard C.; and Schoemaker, Paul J. H.. "Sources 
of Bias in Assessment Procedures for Utility Functions," Management Science 28 
(1982):936-954. 
Hogarth, Robin M. ;  and Kunreuther, Howard, "Risk, Ambiguity, and Insurance," Jour­
nal of Risk and Uncertainty 2 (1989) :5-36. 
Hoy, Michael; and Robson, Arthur J., "Insurance As A Giffen Good," Economics Letters 
8 ( 1981 ) :47-51. 
Kahneman, Daniel; and Tversky, Amos, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk,'' Econometrica 47 (1979):263-291. 
Keane, Michael; Moffitt, Robert; and Runkle, David, "Real Wages over the Business 
Cycle: Estimating the Impact of Heterogeneity with Micro Data," The Journal of 
Political Economy 96 (1988): 1232-1266. 
30 
Laskey, Kathryn Blackmond; and Fischer, Gregory W., "Estimating Utility Functions 
in the Presence of Response Error,'' Management Science 33 (1987):965-980. 
Lee, Hyong J. ;  and Pinches, George E., "On Optimal Insurance Purchasing," Journal 
of Risk and Insurance 55 (1988):145-149. 
Lutz, Nancy A. ,  "Warranties as Signals Under Consumer Moral Hazard," Rand Journal 
ofEeonomics 20{1989):-239-255. 
MacDonald, Don N. ;  Murdoch, James C. ;  and White, Harry L., "Uncertain Hazards, In­
surance, and Consumer Choice: Evidence from Housing Markets,'' Land Economics 
63 (1987):361-371. 
Machina, Mark J., "Stochastic Choice Functions Generated from Deterministic Prefer­
ences Over Lotteries," The Economic Journal 95 (1985):575-594. 
Magat, Wesley A. ;  Viscusi, W. Kip; and Huber, Joel, "Consumer Processing of Hazard 
Warning Information," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1 (1988):201-232. 
Marshall, Robert C. ;  Richard, Jean-Francois; and Zarkin, Gary A., "Posterior Proba­
bilities of the Independence Axiom With Nonexperimental Data (or Buckle Up and 
Fan Out)," Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 10 (1992):31-44. 
McCurdy, Thomas E., "A Simple Scheme for Estimating an Intertemporal Model of 
Labor Supply and Consumption in the Presence of Taxes and Uncertainty," Inter­
national Economic Review 24 (1983)265-289. 
McCurdy, Thomas E.,  "An Empirical Model of Labor Supply in a Life-Cycle Setting," 
The Journal of Political Economy 89 (1981): 1059-1085. 
Mehra, Rajnish; and Prescott, Edward C. ,  "The Equity Risk Premium: A Puzzle,'' 
Journal of Monetary Economics 15 (1988):145-161.  
Meyer, R. F. ;  and Pratt, J. W., "The Consistent Assessment and Fairing of Preference 
Functions,'' IEE Trans. Systems Sci. Cybernetic SSC-4, 3 (1968):270-278. 
Mossin, Jan, "Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing," Journal of Political Economy 
76 (1968):553-568. 
Mosteller, Frederick; and N9gee, Philip, "An Experimental Measurement of Utility,'' 
The Journal of Political Economy 5 (1951) :371-404. 
Priest, George L. ,  "A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty," The Yale Law Jour­
nal 90 (1981): 1297-1352. 
Rapoport, Ammon; Zwick, Rami; and Funk, Sandra G. ,  "Selection of Portfolios with 
Risky and Riskless Assets: Experimental Tests of Two Expected Utility Models." 
Journal of Economic Psychology 9 (1988):169-194. 
31 
Samuelson, William; and Zeckhauser, Richard, "Status Quo Bias in Decision Making,'' 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1 (1988) :7-60. 
Schmalensee, Richard, "Option Demand and Consumer's Surplus: Valuing Price Changes 
under Uncertainty,'' The A merican Economic Review 62 (1972):813-824. 
Schwartz, Alan; and Wilde, Louis L., "Warranty Markets and Public Policy," lnforma­
- -tiowBconvmics·"flnd-Policy +{1'983) :55"67. 
Shimp, Terence A. ;  and Bearden, William 0. (1982), "Warranty and Other Extrinsic 
Cue Effects on Consumers' Risk Perceptions," Journal of Consumer Research 9 
(No. 1 ) ,  June : 38-47. 
Shogren, Jason F. ,  "The Impact of Self-Perception and Self-Insurance on Individual 
Response to Risk," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 3 (1990) :191-204. 
Smith, Vernon L. ,  "Optimal Insurance Coverage,'' The Journal of Political Economy 10 
(1966):68-77. 
Smith, V. Kerry; and Desvousges, William H., "An Empirical Analysis of the Economic 
Value of Risk Changes," Journal of Political Economy 95 (1987):89-114. 
Szpiro, George G. ,  "Optimal Insurance Coverage,'' Journal of Risk and Insurance 52 
(1985):704-710. 
Tversky, Amos, "Additivity, Utility, and Subjective Probability," Journal of Mathemat­
ical Psychology 4 (1967) : 175-201. 
Viscusi, W. Kip; and Evans, William N. ,  "Utility Functions That Depend on Health 
Status: Estimates and Economic Implications,'' The American Economic Review 
80 (1990) :353-374. 
Viscusi, W. K. ;  Magat, W. A. ;  and Huber, J. , "An Investigation of the Rationality of 
Consumer Valuations of Multiple Health Risks,'' The Rand Journal of Economics 
18 (1987):465-4 79. 
Weil, Philippe, "The Equity Premium Puzzle and the Risk-Free Rate Puzzle,'' Journal 
of Monetary Economics 24 (1989):401-421. 
32 
